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ABSTRACT
Neural networks recently have been used to solve many real-world tasks such as image
recognition and can achieve high effectiveness on these tasks. Despite being popularly used
in many applications, neural network models have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial
examples, i.e., carefully crafted examples aiming to mislead machine learning models. Ad-
versarial examples can pose potential risks on safety/security-critical applications. Existing
defense approaches are still vulnerable to emerging attacks, especially in a white-box attack
scenario. In this thesis, we focus on mitigating the adversarial attacks by improving machine
learning models to be more robust against those attacks.
In particular, we propose a new defense approach, named MulDef, based on robustness
diversity. Our approach consists of (1) a general defense framework based on diverse models
and (2) a technique for generating diverse models to achieve high defense capability. Our
framework generates multiple models (constructed from the target model) to form a model
family. The model family is designed to achieve robustness diversity (i.e., an adversarial
example crafted to attack one model may not succeed in attacking other models in the
family). At runtime, a model is randomly selected from the family to process each input
example. Our evaluation results show that MulDef (with only up to 5 models in the family)
can substantially improve the target model’s robustness against adversarial examples by 19–
78% in a white-box attack scenario among MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Tiny ImageNet datasets,
while maintaining similar accuracy on legitimate examples.
Our general framework can also inspire rich future research to construct a desirable model
family achieving higher robustness diversity.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Neural networks recently have been used to solve many real-world tasks such as image
recognition and can achieve high effectiveness on these tasks [1]. However, given a legitimate
input that the model can produce correct results, previous research [2, 3, 4, 5] proposed
various attack approaches to perturb the input by applying imperceptible modification on the
input to fool the model, i.e., causing the model to produce incorrect result for the perturbed
input. We refer to such perturbed input an adversarial example and the model being attacked
the target model. These attack approaches can be used in two attack scenarios: (1) a white-
box attack scenario where the attackers have complete knowledge about the target model
(and also its defense approaches), and (2) a black-box attack scenario where the attackers
do not know anything about the target model (or its defense approaches), but know the
output produced by the model, given an arbitrary example. We focus on improving the
target model against the white-box attack scenario, which is known to be harder to defend
against.
With various effective attack approaches being invented for the two attack scenarios, a
number of defense approaches such as adversarial training [6, 2] and defensive distillation [7]
were proposed. However, these existing approaches are not robust against various attacks,
especially in the white-box attack scenario, facing three main limitations. (1) Ineffectiveness
against re-attack. The improved target model resulted from some defense approaches such
as adversarial training is still vulnerable to adversarial examples generated by reapplying
the same attack approach on the improved model in the white-box attack scenario. These
attack approaches rely on computing the model’s gradient. Even after the defense approach
of adversarial training improves the model with additional adversarial examples in the train-
ing set, the attack approaches can still compute the gradient of the improved model and
generate new adversarial examples. Our preliminary results (Figure 3.4a) also suggest that
adversarial training alone is ineffective in the white-box attack scenario, where attackers
have complete knowledge about the model. One potentially effective variation of adversarial
training includes modification of the loss function used to optimize the model parameters [5],
but that variation requires manually changing the target model’s implementation for differ-
ent attacks. (2) Ineffectiveness against transferable attack. Adversarial examples have the
transferability property: adversarial examples can be used to transfer attacks across mod-
els [8]. So attackers can train a substitute model (on which white-box attack can be applied)
for the target model and generate adversarial examples for the substitute model to indirectly
attack the target model [2]. This transferability property can also be used to attack the tar-
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get model in a black-box attack scenario [9]. (3) Bypassable distillation. Even after defensive
distillation, attackers can still compute the gradient of the inputs to the pre-softmax layer
and reduce the magnitude of the inputs to the softmax layer [10].
To address these three main limitations, we propose a new defense approach, named
MulDef, based on robustness diversity. Our approach consists of (1) a general defense
framework based on multiple models and (2) a technique for generating these models to
achieve high defense capability. Our defense framework includes two components: the model
generator and runtime model selector. The design of the general defense framework is based
on the design principle of security through diversity. Such diversity among multiple models
introduces uncertainty in the target model [11], making it harder to attack. We design
our general framework based on our main insight that existing attack approaches attack a
single-model machine learning system by computing the target model’s gradient based on
its loss function.
In particular, the model generator constructs a model family to assure that an adversarial
example generated for one model in the family cannot fool other models in the family. The
model family addresses the limitations of ineffectiveness against re-attack and transferable
attack. To address the limitation of bypassable distillation, the runtime model selector
uses a low-cost random strategy to select a model in a model family to be applied on a
given example such that the attackers do not know beforehand which model to compute the
gradient even when distillation can be bypassed. Such random strategy increases difficulty
for the reverse engineering efforts by attack approaches. Note that generally (deterministic)
runtime analysis (e.g., multi-model majority voting [12, 13]) can be conducted on a given
example and all models in the family to pick the model that is robust to the example.
However, such runtime analysis is costly and unscalable.
In our general defense framework, the runtime model selector has to select a model (in the
family of diverse models) that is robust to any given example with a high chance. Thus there
are two main desirable properties of the model family. (1) Legitimate-behavior preservation.
The models in the family shall preserve the same accuracy on legitimate examples as the
target model. (2) Robustness diversity. Given an adversarial example, the majority of the
models in the family are robust to the example; in this way, even when the adversarial
example is carefully constructed to attack one model in the family successfully (e.g., in a
white-box attack scenario), there is at most N−1
N
chance for randomly selecting from the
family another model robust to the adversarial example, where N is the family size (i.e.,
the number of the models in the family). We introduce a new metric named diversity
measurement to quantify the robustness diversity of a model family.
In addition, while aiming to satisfy the preceding two properties, N , the number of models
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generated for the family, shall aim to be as high as possible in order to increase the defense
capability. The reason is that the chance for randomly selecting the model based on which
the adversarial example is carefully constructed (and thus likely successful in attacking) is at
least 1/N . The larger the value N is, the higher the chance of selecting a robust model for a
given example is. However, increasing N makes it more challenging to satisfy the preceding
two properties. Even for large N , if many models are similar to the target model, the chance
of selecting a robust model can still be low.
To demonstrate the benefits of our general framework, our approach includes a tech-
nique for generating these multiple models to achieve robustness diversity. In particular,
for the first property (i.e., legitimate-behavior preservation), our technique constructs each
additional model by using the same architecture and parameter configuration as the tar-
get model, and the majority of the training examples are from the original training set to
train the target model. For the second property (i.e., robustness diversity), the models in
the family should be diverse and complementary. To accomplish so, our technique trains
later-constructed models with some adversarial examples for the earlier-constructed models.
In summary, this thesis makes the following main contributions:
• A general defense framework based on multiple models constructed from the target
model.
• A novel technique for generating these multiple models to achieve high robustness
diversity.
• Comprehensive evaluation on three attack approaches (Fast Gradient Sign Method [5],
Carlini & Wagner attack of type L2 [2], Projected Gradient Descent [14]) for show-
ing substantial benefits of our general framework instantiated with the technique for
improving defense capability. Moreover, we include the analysis for strong adaptive
attacks that are specifically designed to break our defense approach.
We choose the random strategy for the runtime model selector in the target model; how-
ever, there are other strategies, which we can explore in future work, such as using majority
vote across all the models in the family. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 provides some background related to adversarial attacks and defenses. Chapter 3
explains our MulDef approach in more detail. Chapter 4 discusses our experiments and
evaluation. Chapter 5 includes more discussion related to our approach. Chapter 6 presents
related work. Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AND DEFENSES
In this chapter, we illustrate the terminology and basic attacks and defense approaches in
previous/related work.
2.1 LEGITIMATE VS. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
We focus on addressing adversarial example attacks on neural network models for clas-
sification tasks. A legitimate example x is an example that occurs naturally [15] for the
classification task. For example, if a classification task is to classify digits, legitimate ex-
amples can be images of real digits without other elements. An adversarial example [8] x′
is an example similar to a legitimate example with imperceptible changes (of the legitimate
example) that can change the target model’s prediction on the example.
2.2 ATTACK APPROACHES
An attack approach takes a legitimate example and then tries to generate an adversarial
example similar to the legitimate example. Thus in our experiment setup (Chapter 4), we
control each attack configuration to generate only an adversarial example within a certain
distance from the given legitimate example in order to avoid human effort to label the
adversarial example. There are two types of adversarial attack: targeted and untargeted
attack. An untargeted attack finds an adversarial example x′ that changes the target model’s
prediction to any other class label. A targeted attack also has a specific class label and finds
an adversarial examples x′ that changes the target model’s prediction to the specific class
label. In this thesis, we consider only untargeted attacks, because our goal is to make the
target model more robust. If an adversarial example can change the target model’s prediction
to any other class label, our defense fails to protect against that adversarial example.
We evaluate our proposed defense approach against major existing attack approaches as
described below.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM [6] generates adversarial examples itera-
tively. Let l be the ground-truth label of x. Let J(x, l) be the loss function of classifying x
as label l. For each pixel, FGSM updates the pixel according to the sign of the gradient of
the loss function at the pixel. Formally, FGSM iteratively modifies x as follows:
x′ = x+ ε · sign(∇xJ(x, l)) (2.1)
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Carlini & Wagner attack (C&W). C&W [2] generates adversarial examples with small
perturbation δ through the following optimization
δ = arg min
δ′
D(x, x+ δ′) + c · f(x+ δ′) (2.2)
where D is a distance metric, c is a constant to balance constraints, and a logit-based
objective function f(·) is designed in such a way that f(x′) ≤ 0 if and only if the classifier
misclassifies x′, indicating that the attack succeeds. Such logic-based objective function
enables C&W to generate adversarial examples robust against the defensive distillation [7].
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). PGD [14] is similar to FGSM, but more powerful.
PGD is an iterative variant of FGSM. In each iteration, PGD updates the example as follows:
x′i+1 = π{FGSM(x′i)} (2.3)
where π is a clip function to keep x′i+1 within a defined perturbation range.
FGSM is fast, simple, and can be powerful. C&W and PGD are state-of-the-art attack
approaches. There are different threat levels of adversarial attack, categorized by the amount
of attackers’ knowledge and their goal [16]. In a white-box attack scenario, the attackers have
complete knowledge of the target model. The attackers’ goal is misclassification, altering
the output classification to any class label different from the original one. A black-box
attack scenario has the same goal, but less knowledge. The attackers have access to only
the oracle. We focus on the white-box attack scenario; however, our evaluation also includes
the black-box attack scenario.
2.3 DEFENSE APPROACHES
We next describe two main existing defense approaches proposed in previous work.
Adversarial training. The idea of adversarial training [6, 2] is to make the target model
more general and have some exposure to adversarial examples. A straightforward way is to
augment the training set by replacing some training samples with the corresponding adver-
sarial examples generated by an attack approach [17]. Also, one can train the model using
an adversarial objective function to improve the robustness and generality of a classifier [14].
Adversarial examples can also be crafted from pre-trained models (e.g., ones from Ensemble
Adversarial Training [18]).
Defensive distillation. Some attack approaches rely on optimizing an objective function
by computing the gradient of the target model. Thus it would be useful for a defender to
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hide the gradient of the target model. Defensive distillation [7] trains a classifier to cause
a rapid reduction of its gradient over an input, resulting in that an attacker can hardly
perform an attack requiring computing gradients. Defensive distillation hides the gradient
between the pre-softmax layer and softmax outputs by using distillation training.
Some other existing defense approaches address the problem in different ways. First,
they detect whether an example is adversarial by training a model detector [19]. Second,
they reform the detected adversarial example to a legitimate example [15] or classify the
adversarial example by using a highly nonlinear model [20].
In general, existing defense approaches extend the target model in various ways. Some
approaches improve the target model against adversarial examples by modifying the weights
and parameters of the target model. Some approaches [15] do not modify the target model
at all, but detect and modify adversarial examples before passing them to the target model.
Our proposed MulDef approach does not modify the target model or adversarial examples.
We evaluate our MulDef approach on the following two metrics.
• Test accuracy (TestAcc): the accuracy of MulDef on legitimate examples in the
test set.
• Robustness accuracy: the accuracy of MulDef on adversarial examples generated
by an attack approach. The label of an adversarial example is the label of the legitimate
example used to generate that adversarial example. In other words, this metric is for
untargeted attack.
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CHAPTER 3: APPROACH OF MULDEF
We design our MulDef approach for improving a neural network model to invalidate the
reverse engineering efforts made by attack approaches. The design of the MulDef approach
is based on the design principle of diversity. Diversity achieved by randomly selecting a model
from a family of models introduces uncertainty in the target under defense.
The MulDef approach includes a general defense framework as shown in Figure 3.1. The
framework consists of two components: (1) the model generator and (2) the runtime model
selector. The two components work together to improve the target model’s effectiveness on
adversarial examples. As described in Chapter 1, the model generator aims to produce a
model family for achieving the two properties: (1) legitimate-behavior preservation and (2)
robustness diversity. In addition, we aim to have as many models as possible to increase
the chance that the runtime model selector ends up selecting a robust model for any given
example.
First, let us formulate the problem. Given a target model T , we construct a model family
(consisting of T,M1,M2, . . . ,Mp) that achieves the following objectives:
1. The difference between the lowest test accuracy of the models in the family and the
test accuracy of T as formulated below shall be minimized:
|min{TestAcc(M1), . . . ,TestAcc(Mp)} −TestAcc(T )| (3.1)
2. For a given adversarial example x, the total number of models (in the family) success-
fully attacked by x shall be minimized.
3. The family size p shall be maximized.
By trying to achieve all three objectives together, we may confront a situation similar
to the space-time tradeoff. When we generate many models (increasing p), those models
should be diverse enough such that the majority of them are not successfully attacked by
the same adversarial example. Moreover, they cannot be too diverse as we need to achieve
the legitimate-behavior preservation. Our idea exploration in solving this problem suggests
that we may focus only on achieving the first two objectives and then we can keep increasing
more models as long as we do not compromise (much) the first two objectives.
In the rest of this chapter, we first introduce a new metric, diversity measurement, for
the second objective, to measure the majority-model robustness. Then we explain the two
components in our general framework along with empirical exploration on design choices for
our model-generation technique.
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Figure 3.1: Our general defense framework. Model generator constructs p similar models to
T : M1,M2, . . . ,Mp. Given an input example x, MulDef randomly selects one model to
compute the class label for x.
3.1 DIVERSITY MEASUREMENT
We measure the diversity of the model family based on the robustness of majority of
models against adversarial examples generated targeting on one of the models. The detailed
steps are as follows: (1) generate adversarial examples for each model in the family; (2) for
each generated example i, count the number of models that the example can successfully
attack, denoted as si; (3) plot the distribution of si, i.e., the number of models that each






where a is the number of adversarial examples and n is the size of the model family. Infor-
mally if most examples successfully attack fewer models in the family (low si), the model
family is more diverse (close to 1).
3.2 GENERAL DEFENSE FRAMEWORK AND MODEL-GENERATION
TECHNIQUE
According to Figure 3.1, given a target model, the model generator constructs a family
of models. Models in the family (except the target model) are trained with additional
adversarial examples from the specified attack approach. Note that the specified attack
approach used to train the adversarial examples do not need to be the same as the attack
approach that we are defending against.
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3.2.1 Model-Generation Technique
To generate other additional models in the family, we initially start with the simple idea
of adversarial training [6, 2]. In particular, given a target model T , we initially construct
only one additional model M1 that has the same architecture and parameter setting as T .
However, M1 is trained with an augmented dataset (the training set plus some adversarial
examples for T ). Note that the adversarial examples are generated in the white-box attack
scenario. Let AdvMi denote the set of adversarial examples for Mi and AdvT denote the set
of adversarial examples (generated by the specified attack approach in the white-box attack
scenario) for the target model T . We notice that M1 performs better on the adversarial
examples for T (AdvT ), but M1 still performs worse on its own adversarial examples (AdvM1).
In fact, augmenting the training set cannot really improve the model against adversarial
attacks. Next, we construct more models, M1,M2,M3, . . . ,Mp, where p denotes the number
of additional models. The next question is how to train M2,M3, . . . ,Mp.
For our model-generation technique, we devise the following two mechanisms to create the
training set for each model:
• Solution 1. The training set of Mi is constructed as the union of the original train-
ing set and the adversarial examples generated for the previously constructed model
AdvMi−1 .
• Solution 2. The training set of Mi is constructed as the union of the original training
set and the adversarial examples generated for each of all the previously constructed
models AdvT , AdvM1 , AdvM2 , . . . , AdvMi−1 .
To compare the two solutions, we measure the diversity of two families of models (with the
family size chosen as 5), each of which is constructed by using the two proposed solutions. We
find that a model family constructed by Solution 2 performs better than that constructed
by Solution 1. Figure 3.2 shows the diversity measurement of the two model families. In
Solution 1, the majority of the adversarial examples successfully attack 2 to 3 models.
However, the majority of the adversarial examples successfully attack at most one model in
Solution 2. Our experimental results also confirm that the model family constructed by
Solution 2 has a higher accuracy.
One observation to explain such results is that in the first solution, AdvM2 may not be
representative for AdvM1 . So M3 (trained with the union of the original training set and
AdvM2) can still be vulnerable to AdvM1 . In the second solution, we train M3 with the
union of the original training set and AdvT , AdvM1 , AdvM2 to make M3 more robust against
all the previously constructed models’ adversarial examples. Thus, we implement MulDef
9
Figure 3.2: Diversity measurement of two model families constructed with Solution 1 and
Solution 2. Each red dot represents the mean.
Figure 3.3: Comparison of the two solutions of augmenting the training set for constructing
additional models.
by following the second solution. It is worth noting that the last model, which is trained
with all the other models’ adversarial examples, seems to be more robust than other models.
However, the reason that we still include other models in our defense is that the last model
is vulnerable to its own adversarial set (AdvM3), and all the models in the family could be
complementary to each other.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the idea of having multiple models and why Solution 2 performs
better than Solution 1. Let the rectangle in each solution represent the set of all adversarial
examples for the target model (AdvT ⊂ S) under a given attack approach. This set can be
infinite. MulDef incrementally constructs additional models one by one. First, MulDef
constructs M1 aiming to defend against a subset of AdvT by training M1 with some adver-
sarial examples for T . The circle for M1 covers the subset of AdvT that M1 can defend.
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MulDef keeps constructing more models to cover more space in the rectangle, indicating
that MulDef is getting more robust to adversarial examples. Intuitively, MulDef per-
forms well when many of the constructed models cover a large portion of the rectangle. The
difference between Solution 1 and Solution 2 is that MulDef trains M3 with the union
of the original training set and AdvT , AdvM2 in Solution 1, but trains M3 with the union of
the original training set and AdvT , AdvM1 , AdvM2 in Solution 2. Thus, M3 in Solution 2 is
likely able to defend against adversarial examples for M1, resulting in having a higher chance
that a given adversarial example can be defended by all the three models (M1,M2,M3).
According to Figure 3.3, a given adversarial example x can be defended by only M1 and
M2 in Solution 1. However, x can be defended by all the three models in Solution 2.
A higher number of additional models that are robust to x result in a higher chance that
MulDef selects a right model at runtime.
3.2.2 Runtime Model Selector
To combine multiple models together, MulDef randomly selects a model from the family
of models T,M1,M2,M3, . . . ,Mp to compute the class label for each given input example.
The intuition of this strategy is to be able to introduce uncertainty in the target model
(by the design principle of diversity) within the family of models so that it is hard for
the attackers to generate adversarial examples that can attack all or most of the models.
Moreover, this runtime model selector acts as a wall to hide the gradient of a single model,
because the attackers do not know in advance which model MulDef ends up selecting at
runtime. This random strategy shares the same spirit of defensive distillation [7], which
attempts to hide the gradient of the target model.
3.3 EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION ON DESIGN CHOICES
Before settling down on our approach, we also conduct some experiments to see whether
using only adversarial training can make the target model more robust against adversar-
ial examples. We create two convolutional neural network models that can achieve about
99.13%/80.4% test accuracy (on the test set) for both MNIST and CIFAR-10. Then we use
FGSM to attack the model in the white-box attack scenario. Without adversarial training,
the model has about 8.87%/13.79% robustness accuracy against FGSM for MNIST/CIFAR-
10. Then we try augmenting the training set with adversarial examples (generated by FGSM)
to see whether the model is more robust. Note that we run the experiment three times and re-
port the average accuracy. Figure 3.4a shows that augmenting adversarial examples for both
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(a) Robustness accuracy of target model T
when its training set is augmented with dif-
ferent quantities of adversarial examples.
(b) Robustness accuracy of model D (on
AdvT ) when its training set is augmented
with different quantities of Adv′T .
Figure 3.4: Results of using adversarial training against FGSM white-box attack for MNIST
and CIFAR-10 datasets.
datasets can even worsen the model: the more adversarial examples we augment, the lower
robustness accuracy the model achieves. According to Figure 3.4a, the robustness accuracy
of target model T for MNIST/CIFAR-10 surprisingly goes down to be under 2.50%/13.00%
when we augment the training set with more than 50% of the original training set’s size.
How about constructing another model D that is robust to the target model’s adversarial
examples (AdvT )? Thus, we try to construct a new model D with the same architecture
as T , and train D with the original training set augmented with a different set of adver-
sarial examples for T (Adv′T ) to see how D performs on AdvT . The results in Figure 3.4b
show that the robustness accuracy of model D on AdvT is higher when we augment more
adversarial examples especially in the beginning for both datasets. Then the robustness
accuracy converges to around 97%/74% for MNIST/CIFAR-10. Notice that the robustness
accuracy does not significantly change when we augment more than around 15-20% of ad-
versarial examples for MNIST and CIFAR-10. So we decide that in our MulDef approach,
we construct other models by using 15% of adversarial examples to augment each training
set, because having too many adversarial examples in the training set can decrease the test
accuracy. For example, if we use the augment rate of 20%, the test accuracy of the fifth
model in the family goes down by 4% for CIFAR-10. There is a tradeoff between robustness
accuracy and test accuracy.
One may wonder why we decide to augment the training set with adversarial examples.
We can also use only adversarial examples for T to train other additional models. If we
use only adversarial examples to train other additional models, the additional models will
perform worse on legitimate examples (in the test set), not being desirable.
According to the preceding observation, simply retraining the target model with adver-
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sarial examples cannot significantly make the model more robust against future adversarial
examples as the attack approach also knows everything about the retrained target model.
However, having multiple models helps as an adversarial example for one model may not
be able to fool another model. The runtime model selector helps combine multiple models
together. We use the random selection strategy because it is simple, low-cost, and provides
some probabilistic guarantee that MulDef will not likely select a model that is vulnerable
to a given adversarial example when we have many models. Our evaluation includes exper-
iments to investigate on how many additional models our model-generation technique can
generate while achieving legitimate-behavior preservation and robust diversity.
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CHAPTER 4: EVALUATION
In this chapter, we evaluate the effectiveness of our MulDef defense approach in various
settings. In addition, we compare MulDef to other existing defense approaches, including
other analysis on how our approach works.
4.1 EXPERIMENT SETUP
We discuss the datasets and models used in our evaluation. We run all the evaluations
three times and report the average accuracy to reduce chance of accidental observations.
4.1.1 Datasets
We evaluate our approach on three popular public datasets as listed below.
• MNIST (MNIST) is a dataset of handwritten digits, consisting of ten labels for the
ten digits. We select 60,000 examples for the training set and 10,000 examples for the
test set. Each image is a 28× 28 black and white image.
• CIFAR-10 (CIFAR) is a widely used dataset consisting of 10 labels. We select
50,000 examples for the training set and 10,000 examples for the test set. So there are
6,000 images per class. Each image is a 32× 32 color image.
• Tiny ImageNet (ImageNet) is part of Stanford University’s CS231n course and the
tiny ImageNet challenge [21]. The dataset contains 100,000 images across 200 classes.
Each class has 50 test images. Tiny ImageNet is a strict subset of ILSVRC2014 (the
actual ImageNet dataset). All images have a higher resolution of 64×64 than the ones
in the first two datasets.
4.1.2 Target Model
We use three different convolutional neural network models for the three datasets (MNIST,
CIFAR, and ImageNet) as listed below.
• ModelA: We follow the previous study on FGSM [5] and use the same model in the
study to evaluate FGSM with MNIST. The model mainly consists of three convolu-
tional layers with 64 neurons for each layer and ReLU as the activation function, and
a densely-connected layer of 10 neurons for each digit.
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• ModelB: We slightly adjust the model for CIFAR-10 in the study by C&W [2]. The
model mainly consists of four convolutional layers with 64 neurons for the first two
layers, 128 neurons for the next two layers, and ReLU as their activation function, two
densely-connected layers of 256 neurons, and a densely-connected layer of 10 neurons
for each class. The only difference is that we add dropouts in both the convolutional
layers and densely-connected layers. We also add L2-norm regularization in the first
two densely-connected layers.
• ResNet: We use ResNet18, proposed in the previous study [1], to evaluate the perfor-
mance of MulDef on a larger model. ResNet18 consists of 18 different convolution
layers. We also apply a technique of data augmentation while training the model to
improve its accuracy as suggested in the study.
For MNIST, we apply ModelA denoted as MNIST(A). For CIFAR-10, we apply
ModelA and ResNet denoted as CIFAR(B) and CIFAR(Res), respectively. For Ima-
geNet, we apply ResNet denoted as ImageNet(Res).
We set the max epoch equal to 50 for the MNIST dataset and 100 for the CIFAR-10
dataset. The training processes adopt the early stopping technique used to avoid overfitting.
The technique stops the training process when the validation loss fails to reduce by at least
0.001 for 5 epochs. Table 4.1 shows the test accuracy of each model that we use. Note that
that the Tiny ImageNet is more difficult to classify as it has 200 classes, and the training
set contains only about 500 examples per class.
4.1.3 Attack Approaches
To check whether a model outputs a correct label for an adversarial example generated
by an attack approach, we need to set the parameters of the attack approach to constrain
the amount of perturbation on legitimate examples, so that we can use the original label as
the ground truth.
In FGSM, the degree of perturbation is controlled by the parameter eps. We set eps to
be 0.3/0.05/0.05 for MNIST/CIFAR-10/ImageNet.
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In C&W, we use C&W attack of type L2, and the degree of perturbation is controlled
by the parameter confidence. We set this value to 0.01 for all datasets. Another parameter
named max iterations is used to control the max number of iterations for generating adver-
sarial examples. We set max iterations to 1000 for all datasets. This value is high enough
to generate adversarial examples for reducing the target model’s accuracy to 0%. Other
parameters in C&W are set as their default values.
In PGD, we set the parameter eps the same as in the FGSM experiments, because the
PGD approach is built on top of FGSM. We reduce eps iter to 0.01 from its default value
0.05 for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, because we use lower perturbation (eps = 0.05), but
increase nb iter to 30 from its default value 10.
4.1.4 MulDef Setup
There are two main parameters to configure MulDef: (1) the percentage of adversarial
examples augmented to the training set, and (2) the number of additional models to be
constructed. As discussed in Chapter 3, we select 15% as the percentage of augmented
adversarial examples. To explore an optimal number of additional models, we set the number
of additional models to be 1, 2, 3, and 4. Thus in total, MulDef has at most 5 models
including the target model.
4.2 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We measure the effectiveness of MulDef for (increasing the robustness of) the models
on the three datasets against FGSM, C&W, and PGD.
4.2.1 Effectiveness of MulDef in White-box Attack Scenario
To evaluate our approach in the white-box attack scenario, we perform two types of attacks
to MulDef:
1. Non-adaptive Attack. Because MulDef constructs a family of models: T,M1,M2, . . . ,
we can try the three attacks (FGSM, C&W, and PGD) in a divide-and-conquer fashion
by attacking each model separately to come up with the strongest adversarial examples
for MulDef.
2. Adaptive Attack. Defending against non-adaptive attacks is necessary but not suf-
ficient. Thus, we introduce two adaptive attacks built on top of FGSM and PGD.
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Figure 4.1: Robustness accuracy of MulDef for MNIST(A) against PGD on different sets
of adversarial examples. The figure contains five different settings of MulDef with different
sizes of model family.
Effectiveness of MulDef under Non-adaptive Attack. For non-adaptive attack, we
generate a set of adversarial examples by using the existing attacks for each model in the
model family to find the strongest adversarial set (the one with the highest attack suc-
cess rate). We measure the robustness accuracies of MulDef along with each model
in the model family against all sets of adversarial examples. The robustness accuracy of
MulDef that we report is the lowest one (which is based on the strongest possible adver-
sary) among all models. The median adversarial L∞ distance from FGSM and PGD attacks
on MNIST/CIFAR/ImageNet is 0.3/0.05/0.05. The median adversarial L2 distances from
C&W attack on MNIST/CIFAR is 1.829/0.1823, respectively.
Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show the robustness accuracy of the target model T
(MulDef with only one model – the target model) and the robustness accuracy of MulDef
(with 2, 3, 4, and 5 models) on different sets of adversarial examples (AdvT , AdvM1 , . . . , AdvM4
denoted as different colored bars). Due to space limit, we show the figures of results only
against PGD (the state-of-the-art attack). The figures show that the more models MulDef
has in the family, the higher robustness accuracy MulDef gains.
Table 4.2 summarizes the performance of MulDef against different attacks. These results
indicate that MulDef can successfully defend Non-adaptive Attack. For the case of
PGD/ImageNet(Res), MulDef achieves only 26.80%, which looks relatively low. One
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Figure 4.2: Robustness accuracy of MulDef for CIFAR(B) against PGD on different sets
of adversarial examples.The figure contains five different settings of MulDef with different
sizes of model family.
reason is that the Tiny ImageNet dataset contains very few examples (500) per class, and
our ResNet model achieves only around 49% test accuracy.
Effectiveness of MulDef under Adaptive Attack. To extensively evaluate our MulDef
approach, we develop two adaptive attacks built upon FGSM and PGD. These two adaptive
attacks are designed specifically to attack our approach. Because our approach randomly
selects a model to predict for a given example, we can improve FGSM and PGD (which are
made for attacking a single model) to consider all the models in the model family during
their generation of adversarial examples. Instead of maximizing the loss function of a single
model, we maximize the sum of all the loss functions as follows:




where Ji is the loss function of each model i in the model family. We conduct experiments on
our MulDef approach with 5 models for our target models. We also test our adaptive attack
when the size of the perturbation is unbounded (setting the eps to be 1.0 for MNIST), and
the adaptive attack built upon PGD can reach about 97% attack success rate (i.e., MulDef
has only 3% accuracy). Thus, this adaptive attack is sufficiently effective. Table 4.4 shows
the robustness accuracy of MulDef against adaptive FGSM and adaptive PGD. We can
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Figure 4.3: Robustness accuracy of MulDef for CIFAR(Res) against PGD on different
sets of adversarial examples. The figure contains five different settings of MulDef with
different sizes of model family.
see that MulDef has relatively low robustness accuracy against Adaptive Attack. To
increase the performance, we need to increase the size of the model family.
We also apply MulDef on a baseline attack approach presented in previous work on
gradient obfuscation attack [22], which is used to attack stochastic gradients in randomized
defenses. Instead of maximizing the sum of all the loss functions, we maximize the sum
of sampled loss functions (multiple randomly chosen loss functions). Against this baseline
attack approach, MulDef achieves higher accuracy against Gradient Obfuscation, de-
noted as the last column in Table 4.4. For all the adaptive attacks (including Gradient
Obfuscation), the median adversarial L∞ distance for MNIST/CIFAR-10 is 0.3/0.05.
4.2.2 Comparison with Other Existing Defense Baselines
We also compare the performance of MulDef with four existing defense baselines. (1)
Mean Blur [23], proposed by Li et al., applies a 3×3 average filter to blur examples/images
before training or applying a model. (2) Feature Squeezing [24], proposed by Xu et al.,
is used to detect an adversarial example by “squeezing” out unnecessary input features.
Median smoothing is an effective squeezer at removing noise in images and outstanding in
their study of the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet datasets. Median smoothing applies a
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Figure 4.4: Robustness accuracy of MulDef for ImageNet(Res) against PGD on different
sets of adversarial examples. The figure contains five different settings of MulDef with
different sizes of model family.
median filter with 2 × 2 window size. (3) PGD Training [14], proposed by Madry et al.,
iteratively adversarially trains the model with PGD adversarial examples. (4) Adaptive
Diversity Promoting Training (ADP Training) [25], proposed by Pang et al., is similar
to our approach of using model ensemble. However, they introduce an ADP regularizer,
which encourages the diversity among the ensemble, and then they combine this regularizer
in the objective function to train all the models simultaneously. Their ADP training is
not scalable for a high number of models and cannot handle large perturbation, so we use
lower perturbation values and use only 3 models as in their evaluation. Tables 4.2 and 4.3
show that MulDef outperforms these defense baselines in most of the cases under the same
setting. Note that some results are missing for PGD Training, because some implementations
are not publicly available and we cannot directly compare the results due to different model
architectures and settings being used.
In addition, Na et al. [26] propose another kind of adversarial training, cascade adversarial
training, which transfers the knowledge of the end results of adversarial training. Their
approach performs better for MNIST as their approach can reach the robustness accuracy
of 81–97%. Our approach performs better for CIFAR-10 as their approach reaches only the
accuracy of 27–38%. We suspect that for complex images such as CIFAR-10 and ImageNet,
our approach can outperform the existing defense approaches.
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FGSM/MNIST(A) 7.66% 67.98% 8.80% 14.37% -
FGSM/CIFAR(B) 15.18% 49.99% 27.45% 21.77% -
FGSM/CIFAR(Res) 9.09% 50.79% 26.02% 22.96% -
FGSM/ImageNet(Res) 6.34% 24.86% 8.82% 6.81% -
C&W/MNIST(A) 0.00% 78.61% 96.15% 95.52% -
C&W/CIFAR(B) 0.00% 60.52% 48.54% 59.95% -
PGD/MNIST(A) 0.00% 73.51% 5.68% 2.13% 93.54%
PGD/CIFAR(B) 0.06% 55.91% 10.43% 4.00% -
PGD/CIFAR(Res) 8.21% 51.20% 23.49% 28.89% 32.59%
PGD/ImageNet(Res) 7.55% 26.80% 9.82% 9.95% -
Table 4.3: Robustness accuracy comparison with ADP Training









FGSM/MNIST(A) ε = 0.2 72.4% 68.6% 52.8%
FGSM/CIFAR(Res) ε = 0.04 46.7% 46.3% 46.2%
C&W/MNIST(A) ε = 1.0 78.5% 66.2% 78.1%
C&W/MNIST(A) ε = 10.0 81.1% 71.8% 23.8%
C&W/CIFAR(B) ε = 0.01 60.5% 50.6% 54.9%
PGD/MNIST(A) ε = 0.15 78.6% 66.4% 41.0%
PGD/CIFAR(Res) ε = 0.02 59.7% 49.2% 30.4%
4.2.3 Cross-Attack Scenario
In the white-box attack scenario, we construct models in MulDef to defend against
one attack approach by using adversarial examples generated based on the same attack
approach. We see that MulDef performs very well. Thus, is MulDef attack-dependent?
Realistically, we cannot know in advance which white-box attack approach the attackers
will use in reality, indicating that we cannot construct models in MulDef based on the
adversarial examples generated by the approach to be used by the attackers. Therefore,
we further investigate the robustness of our approach in the cross-attack scenario, in which
we launch one attack approach (e.g., C&W) to test MulDef built on top of adversarial
examples of a different attack approach (e.g., FGSM).
Table 4.5 shows that no matter which group of adversarial examples MulDef uses to
construct models, MulDef performs better than the target model. Surprisingly, MulDef
built on FGSM adversarial examples is often more robust than it built on C&W adversarial
examples. For example, against C&W attack, MulDef built on FGSM adversarial exam-
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Table 4.4: Comparison of the robustness accuracy of MulDef against Non-adaptive
attack, Adaptive Attack, and Gradient Obfuscation for different datasets.
Dataset
Non-adaptive Adaptive
FGSM PGD FGSM PGD Gradient
Obfusca-
tion
MNIST(A) 67.98% 73.51% 65.68% 22.40% 48.31%
CIFAR(B) 49.99% 55.91% 34.80% 22.69% 35.30%
CIFAR(Res) 50.79% 51.20% 38.95% 24.53% 27.30%
ImageNet(Res) 24.86% 26.80% 19.18% 13.13% 13.81%
Table 4.5: Robustness accuracies of MulDef built on FGSM and C&W adversarial exam-
ples against FGSM and C&W white-box attacks.
Attack / Dataset Tgt model
MulDef
FGSM adv exps C&W adv exps
FGSM/MNIST(A) 7.66% 67.98% 14.96%
FGSM/CIFAR(B) 15.18% 49.99% 26.47%
C&W/MNIST(A) 00.00% 70.52% 78.61%
C&W/CIFAR(B) 00.00% 58.88% 60.52%
ples does not lose much robustness accuracy. However, the robustness accuracy of MulDef
built on C&W adversarial examples drops against FGSM attack. Note that it does not nec-
essarily suggest that FGSM attack is always more powerful than C&W but instead suggests
that FGSM adversarial examples are more suitable than C&W ones to construct diversified
models in MulDef.
We further measure the diversity of model families in MulDef (defined in Chapter 3)
built on FGSM adversarial examples for both datasets. Thus, we create two model
families (of 5 models) built on FGSM attack for MNIST and CIFAR-10. In diversity mea-
surement, we generate adversarial examples with both FGSM and C&W against the two
models that we create. Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of adversarial examples by the
number of models that each example successfully attacks. For example, on average, FGSM
adversarial examples can attack 1.4463 (out of 5) models in the model family for MNIST.
We observe that although previous results suggest that MulDef built on FGSM examples
is more effective, the diversity of the model family for CIFAR-10 (CIFAR-10/FGSM and
CIFAR-10/C&W) is not very high (1− 2.47
5
= 0.51 and 1− 3.06
5
= 0.38). Against C&W, the
average number of models that can be attacked in the model family for CIFAR-10 is 3.06
out of 5. One possible reason is that the data in CIFAR-10 have high dimensions (RGB
images with a lager number of pixels). Small changes in each dimension would enable the
adversarial examples to be adapted to the diverse models. Model families trained for MNIST
demonstrate more robustness diversity than model families trained for CIFAR-10.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of the diversity measurement of two model families (built on FGSM
adversarial examples on MNIST and CIFAR-10). The two boxplots on the left represent
the diversity of the first model family on MNIST against FGSM and C&W attacks. The
two boxplots on the right represent the diversity of the second model family for CIFAR-10
against the two attacks. Each red dot represents the mean.
4.2.4 Effectiveness of MulDef on Original Test Dataset
While achieving higher robustness accuracy, MulDef also maintains about the same test
accuracy as the target model. Table 4.6 shows that in each model family, the additional
models have about the same test accuracy as the target model. The second column under
MulDef indicates the test accuracy of our defense, MulDef.
In summary, MulDef for all the models loses less than 3% test accuracy. From the
experiments, we notice that MulDef’s test accuracy tends to go lower for a larger target
model or dataset. For example, model M4 of MulDef for ImageNet(Res) loses about
3% of its test accuracy. One reason can be that the Tiny ImageNet has a lot more classes
(200 classes) and each class has only 500 examples, even the target model (without any
defense) achieves only 48% test accuracy. Augmenting more adversarial examples can quickly
mislead the model. To decrease the percentage loss in test accuracy, we suggest to reduce
the augmentation rate.
4.2.5 Impact of Different Numbers of Models
Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show that having more models in MulDef can increase
robustness accuracies. Surprisingly, each model can maintain about the same test accuracy
as the target model’s. One may have the concern that when we generate more models,
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Table 4.6: Test accuracy of each model in MulDef when different attacks are used for
different datasets. MulDef contains five models: T (target model),M1,M2,M3,M4.
Attack / Dataset MulDef
Test acc of each model (%)
T M1 M2 M3 M4
FGSM/MNIST(A) 98.91 99.03 98.65 98.90 98.91 98.93
FGSM/CIFAR(B) 77.13 79.78 76.58 76.89 76.46 76.69
FGSM/CIFAR(Res) 82.14 84.09 82.77 82.35 81.30 81.06
FGSM/ImageNet(Res) 45.63 48.23 46.89 45.93 44.41 43.93
C&W/MNIST(A) 98.79 99.03 99.10 99.04 99.04 99.05
C&W/CIFAR(B) 76.19 79.78 76.64 76.29 75.34 75.83
PGD/MNIST(A) 99.03 99.03 99.10 98.99 99.01 98.97
PGD/CIFAR(B) 73.18 76.78 73.90 72.41 72.72 71.50
PGD/CIFAR(Res) 82.25 84.09 82.37 81.61 81.13 81.06
PGD/ImageNet(Res) 45.52 48.23 47.20 45.63 45.16 45.01
the last model may have lower test accuracy than the others, because the last model is
constructed by the most adversarial examples augmented to its training set. It turns out
that those adversarial examples do not have a negative impact or confuse the model when
the model faces against legitimate examples. This result suggests that having more models
could make the classifier more robust against adversarial examples.
Statistically, having more models increases the chance of selecting a robust model for each
given input example at runtime. This assumption is true only when additional models are
complementary to the existing models. In other words, the diversity of the model family is
increasing. Thus we additionally evaluate our approach when using more models. Figure 4.6
shows the white-box robustness accuracy of MulDef. The robustness accuracies converge
when using 7–10 models. The results indicate that at some point, adding more models
does not increase robustness diversity. Ideally, it is better to have more models to improve
robustness diversity. So these results open up more future research directions on how to
improve the model generator to be more effective in generating complementary models.
4.2.6 Impact of Adversarial Training and Randomization in MulDef
Based on the idea of adversarial training, the model generator in MulDef constructs
each additional model one after another, where Mi is trained with the union of the original
training set and AdvT , AdvM1 , AdvM2 , . . . , AdvMi−1 . In other words, for AdvMi , all the other
models constructed after Mi are trained with the training set that includes AdvMi . Therefore,
most models constructed after Mi should be robust to AdvMi . To test this hypothesis, we
measure the average robustness accuracy (on AdvMi) of all the models constructed after Mi,
denoted as the third accuracy in Table 4.7. We can see that the third accuracy is often the
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Figure 4.6: Robustness accuracy of MulDef with different numbers of models based on
Non-adaptive Attack.
Table 4.7: Three robustness accuracies on a set of adversarial examples generated for each
model in the family of 5 models (T,M1,M2,M3,M4). For the set of adversarial examples
for model x (Advx), (1) the first accuracy denotes the accuracy of model x on Advx, (2) the
second accuracy denotes the average accuracy of all the models constructed (by MulDef)
before model x on Advx, and (3) the third accuracy denotes the average accuracy of all the
models constructed (by MulDef) after model x on Advx. Note that MulDef constructs
M1,M2,M3, and M4 in order.
Attack / Dataset
Robustness accuracies on adversarial examples
AdvT (%) AdvM1 (%) AdvM2 (%) AdvM3 (%) AdvM4 (%)
FGSM/MNIST(A) 07.08 / - / 95.28 01.70 / 68.22 / 95.50 02.10 / 79.48 / 80.31 02.94 / 80.65 / 96.55 03.85 / 84.83 / -
FGSM/CIFAR(B) 14.47 / - / 61.08 14.62 / 57.10 / 65.29 13.71 / 63.01 / 68.43 19.27 / 59.75 / 68.49 20.85 / 57.46 / -
FGSM/CIFAR(Res) 09.09 / - / 64.56 10.38 / 55.44 / 65.08 11.16 / 57.75 / 64.53 11.42 / 60.10 / 64.79 12.31 / 62.25 / -
FGSM/ImageNet(Res) 06.34 / - / 32.14 08.24 / 23.26 / 31.69 08.97 / 28.27 / 32.76 09.38 / 30.36 / 33.46 09.76 / 31.17 / -
C&W/MNIST(A) 00.00 / - / 98.57 00.00 / 98.18 / 98.58 00.00 / 98.32 / 98.67 00.00 / 98.03 / 98.75 00.00 / 98.07 / -
C&W/CIFAR(B) 02.09 / - / 74.58 03.33 / 75.47 / 74.50 03.53 / 75.72 / 74.57 05.54 / 75.32 / 74.73 07.55 / 74.94 / -
PGD/MNIST(A) 00.01 / - / 97.03 00.00 / 94.72 / 97.46 00.04 / 92.85 / 97.16 00.55 / 91.74 / 96.54 00.71 / 91.64 / -
PGD/CIFAR(B) 15.20 / - / 65.81 15.06 / 65.37 / 66.18 17.92 / 65.93 / 66.49 18.71 / 66.96 / 67.01 16.63 / 66.63 / -
PGD/CIFAR(Res) 08.21 / - / 66.77 09.47 / 54.92 / 65.69 09.70 / 61.21 / 65.74 10.05 / 61.21 / 66.46 10.14 / 62.26 / -
PGD/ImageNet(Res) 06.34 / - / 32.14 08.24 / 23.26 / 31.69 08.97 / 28.27 / 32.76 09.38 / 30.36 / 33.46 09.76 / 31.17 / -
highest as expected. There are a few cases that the third accuracy is not the highest but is
slightly lower than the second accuracy in C&W/CIFAR(B). We inspect these cases and
find that the third, fourth, and fifth models are not more resilient than the second model
in the family, indicating that the second model in the family already reaches the saturation
point of robustness accuracy. For example, we would need to improve the model construction
in our approach in order to reach higher robustness accuracy for C&W/CIFAR(B). Note
that the cells in the last column in Table 4.7 are missing the third accuracy, because M4 is
the last model in the family.
In order to select a robust model by the runtime model selector with a high chance, most
models constructed before Mi should be robust to AdvMi as well. Thus, we measure the
average accuracy of all the models constructed before Mi on AdvMi , denoted as the second
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accuracy in Table 4.7. Our results show that the second accuracy is also relatively high
compared to the accuracy of Mi on AdvMi (denoted as the first accuracy in the table).
These results raise a question on why most models constructed before Mi can achieve higher
accuracy on AdvMi , even though they are not exposed to AdvMi at all during their training
process. One possible reason is that AdvMi is very specific to Mi, especially for C&W
adversarial examples. And every new model constructed is trained with more adversarial
examples, causing the later constructed models to be different from previously constructed
models.
4.2.7 Effectiveness of MulDef in Black-box Attack Scenario
For the black-box attack scenario where the attackers can access only the target model
output, we first train a substitute model with synthetic inputs selected by a Jacobian-
based heuristic [3] to approximate the target model’s decision boundaries. We use 150
hold-out images from the test set and run 5 Jacobian-based augmentation epochs, and set
the augmentation parameter λ = 0.1. All of these parameters are default values. Then
we apply white-box attacks on the substitute model to generate adversarial examples and
evaluate the target model on those examples.
Table 4.8 shows that MulDef still achieves higher robustness accuracy than the target
model in the black-box attack scenario except when C&W and CIFAR-10 are used. Reasons
that our defense does not substantially improve the target model in the black-box attack
scenario are the fact that black-box attack approaches that we use are not powerful enough
to reveal weakness in the target model and MulDef is built upon the white-box adversarial
examples. We also need a better tuning of parameters or substitute model to improve the
effectiveness of the black-box attack.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
MulDef incrementally constructs additional models one by one. According to Figure 4.6,
we expect that the adversarial accuracy of MulDef should keep increasing as it has more
models, and then eventually stabilize. Thus, we can implement MulDef in such a way
that every time it constructs a new model, we measure the diversity of the model family.
We stop constructing more models, if the average number of models successfully attacked is
non-trivial.
In our evaluations, augmenting 15% of the training set with adversarial examples seems to
be sufficient. However, for some other datasets or target models, we may need to augment
more than 15%. Moreover, one needs to ensure that the test accuracy of each additional
model still preserves. The step of choosing this percentage parameter may require tuning to
achieve a satisfactory result.
In our experiments, we also try a number of different target models for MNIST. Most of
them achieve about the same accuracy around 98–99%; however, we notice that some of the
target models are more robust than the others, due to weakening the transferability property
of the adversarial examples. We find that if we use a more robust target model, our defense
system can achieve substantially higher robustness accuracy.
According to our evaluation results, MulDef slightly improves the target model’s adver-
sarial accuracy by about 2–10% in the black-box attack scenario. We suspect the reason
why we do get much improvement to be that the adversarial examples augmented to the
training set to construct additional models are generated in the white-box attack scenario;
however, we evaluate MulDef in the black-box attack scenario. Another reason is that the
adversarial accuracy baseline (of the target model) is already high. We may get a better
result if we use a better substitute model that makes the black-box attack more effective.
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CHAPTER 6: RELATED WORK
6.1 EXISTING DEFENSES
A variety of approaches have been proposed for defending against adversarial examples.
Meng et al. [15] propose a defense approach named MagNet against adversarial examples.
MagNet consists of two main steps: detect and reform. Like MulDef, MagNet does not
modify the target model. MagNet first detects whether a given input example is adversar-
ial by measuring the distance between the input example and the manifold of legitimate
examples in the training set. If the input example is farther to the manifold of the le-
gitimate examples, the input example is marked as an adversarial example and then gets
reformed/reconstructed to be close to legitimate examples. Finally, the example is passed
to the target model to classify. Their ideas are quite different from our MulDef approach,
because MulDef does not reform the given example. Instead, MulDef trains more models
to handle any example. MagNet does not require the knowledge of the attack approaches,
and can perform well in a gray-box attack scenario (where the attackers know about the
target model and the defense, but not the parameters of the defense), but cannot handle a
white-box attack scenario at all. In fact, MagNet achieves only less than 20% robustness
accuracy against FGSM attack (in the white-box attack scenario) and less than 40% against
C&W on the MNIST dataset [27]. So our approach outperforms MagNet.
Other approaches [28, 29] similar to MagNet generate images similar to the given ad-
versarial example by using Generative Adversarial Net (GAN) [30]. These approaches still
provide ineffective defense against C&W.
Rouhani et al. [31] propose an approach of using complementary but disjoint modular
redundancies to defend against adversarial examples. Although Rouhani et al. claim their
approach to be attack-independent, it still requires a lot of pre-constructed modules, which
are needed to be trained with different attack algorithms. Their approach only guarantees
to detect whether a given input is a legitimate input or not, but there is no guarantee on
the accuracy of the output when the input is adversarial.
Song et al. [32] propose an approach of image purification named PixelDefend to defend
against adversarial examples. PixelDefend requires no knowledge of the attack approach nor
the target model, but uses the PixelCNN model for its state-of-the-art performance in mod-
eling image distributions [33] to detect an adversarial example. Then PixelDefend purifies
the adversarial example by searching for more probable images within a small distance of
the adversarial example. Because PixelDefend only purifies the given adversarial example,
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we can combine this approach with MulDef to proceed with the purified example.
Zantedeschi et al. [34] propose an approach to make the target model more robust against
adversarial examples by reinforcing the model architecture so that its prediction becomes
more stable. Their approach uses the bounded ReLU activation function for hedging against
the forward propagation of adversarial perturbation and Gaussian data augmentation during
training. Their approach is mainly for making the attack visually detectable. However, it
still does not perform well against C&W.
6.2 IMPROVING MACHINE LEARNING MODELS
Our work falls into the general research domain of improving machine learning models.
DeepXplore [35] and DeepTest [36] introduce and leverage the metric of neuron coverage
for a neural network with rectified linear units (ReLUs) as the activation functions. Neuron
coverage measures the percentage of hidden units that can have positive value (for at least
one of the test inputs) in the neural network. DeepGauge [37] further generalizes neuron
coverage by dividing the range of values of each neuron (obtained during training) into
k chunks, and measures whether each of the k chunks can be covered by the test cases.
DeepGauge also measures whether each activation has been made to go above and below a
certain bound. In addition to neuron coverage, a feature-guided approach [38] and concolic
execution [39] approach are also proposed to perform black box testing of image classifiers
using image-specific operations.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we have proposed MulDef, a defense approach against adversarial examples
for neural networks. Our approach consists of (1) a general defense framework based on
multiple models and (2) a technique for generating these multiple models to achieve high
defense capability. In particular, we construct a family of models such that the models are
complementary to each other to accomplish robustness diversity. Our approach is simple,
scalable, and easy to be applied, because it does not modify the target model. We evaluate
our approach on three attack strategies (FGSM, C&W, and PGD) and some adaptive attacks
for three datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Tiny ImageNet). The evaluation results show
that our defense approach substantially improves the target model’s robustness accuracy
by 19–78% against both attack strategies and three datasets, while still maintaining similar
accuracy as the target model on legitimate examples.
We choose the random strategy for the runtime model selector to introduce uncertainty
in the target model. Nevertheless, there can be another strategy based on multiple-model
majority voting [35, 13], which we plan to explore in future work. In particular, our previ-
ous work [13] uses multiple-implementation testing to test an implementation of a machine
learning algorithm, where the majority output across multiple implementations of the same
algorithm is used as a test oracle. MulDef also contains multiple models that are robust
to a given adversarial example, so we may be able to use the majority label across multiple
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